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Abstract. We review the literature on the threat of religious populism to the health of liberal democracies 
today. The literature attributes the presence of populism within liberal democracies to socio-economic 
conditions, the media, and identity politics. In recent years, growing attention has focused on the role 
of social media driving the success of populism and not enough time on the variable of the institution 
of religious fundamentalism impacting interpersonal relationships and social conditioning individuals 
driving the success of populist movements within liberal democracies. There can be little dispute that 
religious populism is an area of importance in democracy studies. Yet, there have been few literature 
reviews on this topic. This paper seeks to identify the literature surrounding this field to help inspire 
research that would help democracy scholars identify whether or not institutions construct socially 
conditioned cognitive distortions for individuals and drive the success of populist movements. Further 
research of the mechanism of religious populism and its impact in shaping perceptions of reality on 
individuals living within democracies is needed. Understanding the mechanism behind religious 
populism and its intersections would empower citizens to contribute to a collectively healthy 
democracy. For the scope of this paper, we will review the relevant intersectional literature on populism 
and religion, focusing on fundamentalism 
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INTRODUCTION 
Populism has evolved into more than a political movement. It is a discourse, an ideology, 
a lifestyle, and, in many ways, a type of religion. For instance, during the 2016 United States 
Election, many news outlets such as Fox News centered the Fundamentalist Evangelical vote. 
There is a distinction between healthy religious institutions and abusive spiritual institutions. 
Further research is needed in identifying this nuance and understanding the consequence of 
abusive spirituality in populism’s many expressions today. Most populists describe themselves 
as hardworking, patriotic, and usually, god-fearing people who support the non-establishment 
elite (Lee, 2006: 358). The literature attributes the presence of populism within liberal 
democracies to socio-economic conditions, the media, and identity politics. In recent years, 
growing attention has focused on the role of social media driving the success of populism, 
failing to consider the variable of religious fundamentalism or social conditioning. Why is it 
that some Christians support, in spite of their Christian values, morally reprehensible leaders 
like Trump, and others do not?  This paper endeavors to review the relevant intersectional 
literature regarding the relationship between populism, religion, and rhetoric. Fundamentalism 
has many expressions, for the scope of this review we will focus on Christian Fundamentalism 
in the United States.  More empirical work is needed to understand the role identity plays in 
perpetuating the cognitive dissonance of supporting politicians who go against nearly every 
value of one’s faith. 
  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
There is a prolific amount of literature on evangelism, fundamentalism and populism 
emerging. However, the literature on religious populism is still sparse “and neglected [as an] 
area of social- scientific research” (Zúquete, 2017: 445). As a result of the overlooked nature 
of religious populism, it would be remiss not to briefly outline the current literature on 
populism that fractures off into more niche discussions of religious populism. One strand of 
the literature hones in on institutions (both church and democracy) to explain the uptick of 
religious populism. A second strand of the literature believes the politicization of religion and 
religious identities has driven the success of populism. This camp links populists’ collective 
action and leveraging religious group identity to spread ideology to leverage support for 
populism. A third strand of the literature focuses on evangelical nationalism, racism, and 
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leveraging cult mentalities to garner support for populist cults like QAnon. This camp I label 
as the ‘false idols camp’ of the literature. 
 
Overview of the current populism literature  
In the controversial book Democracy without Shortcuts, Lafont (2019) covers many 
topics surrounding the democratic deficits within many presumably democratic countries and 
the desire for the populace to take back control from the oligarchic elite. She claims that 
scholarly works such as The People vs. Democracy (Mounk 2018) and How Democracies Die 
(Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018) convey an existential threat to liberal democracies, the decline of 
rights, and political decision-making amongst the citizenry but leave out alternatives to fix 
these problems. There are three points of contention with her work that fracture off to the 
religious populism literature. 
First, she claims many theorists “have quite nasty things to say about citizens” within the 
contemporary democratic literature and are “routinely characterized as politically ignorant, 
irrational… and even tribalistic (Lafont, 2019: 7).” Judgmental language like “quite nasty,” 
constructs a lens that fails to consider why theorists frequently employ value language, not 
simply provide facts. Theorists can create a lens through language that has political 
consequences. This lens exacerbates the divide of “elite” versus “patriot,” which enables an 
environment for religious identity to become salient, as we will discuss in further detail in the 
next section. Second, Lafont posits that deliberative processes are necessary for strengthening 
democratic institutions. Third, and tangential to the second point, is that the most significant 
function of the citizen is the right to legally contest and challenge the constitutionality of 
policies or legal statutes. Ultimately, judicial review is the most vital factor in achieving a 
deliberative democracy (Lafont, 2019). The third point in Lafont’s work progresses seamlessly 
into the discussion surrounding democracy and religion on the debate of secular and religious 
agents within populist pseudo-democratic projects (Cohen, 2020). 
  
Institution of the church 
According to Cohen (2020), Lafont argues that judicial review is imperative for 
preventing the success of populist movements within democracies and briefly discusses how 
religion can shape the judicial process. Cohen (2020) takes issue with this interpretation as it 
overlooks the power of collective action and civil society within democratic institutions today. 
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In earlier work, Cohen and Arato (2018: 1) outline how populists today “hijack religion for 
their own purposes” through leveraging civil society to navigate political institutions. They add 
that “religion can create politicized agendas” and is instrumental in leveraging identity politics 
(ibid). When populists mobilize religious identities through civil society, it can create 
damaging effects for liberal society (Cohen & Arato, 2018). 
Arato, Cohen and Lafont reference the concept of religious associations and judicial 
review, which is tangential to the literature on institutions. Another scholar, Müller, has written 
a prolific amount on the topic of populism which academics frequently draw. He posits the 
mechanics of religious populism within democratic institutions. Many in the populism 
literature hold that, institutionally, populism and constitutionalism are not compatible because 
populists are against institutions (Müller 2017a). Müller (2017b) asserts that populism fosters 
a “deranged democracy'' when operating through democratic institutions, slowly eroding them 
over time. In the chapter Müller (2017a) wrote for the Oxford Handbook of Populism, he argues 
the contrary, claiming that populists tend to work with constitutional constraints to work in 
their favor. 
Drawing upon the theoretical framework posited by Müller, DeHanas & Shterin (2018) 
conduct case studies examining the United States, Britain, and Turkey to demonstrate that 
religion can harm democracy by empowering one type of religious faith and marginalizing 
another. They also highlighted the role religion played in the populist waves of the three cases 
is “often overlooked” (ibid). DeHanas & Shterin (2018) identified that scholars of religious 
populism work under the assumption that democracy is secular. They claim assumptions like 
this will “prove uncomfortable” to set aside but are imperative to remove in order to expand 
the literature (ibid). 
Djupe forwards much of the empirical work surrounding religious institutions and their 
impact on politics. In a 2002 study, Djupe and Grant (2002) tested seven hypotheses 
surrounding the linkage between religious institutions and political participation seeking to 
identify how churches encourage their members to become more civically engaged. The study 
found that churches are an efficient way for members to engage in political institutions like 
voting. An interesting preliminary finding from this study was that churches mobilize their 
members to participate when church activities have political consequences (Djupe & Grant, 
2002). For example, abortion is a single issue that has become so salient that many evangelicals 
are willing to overlook every other policy a candidate has so long as they are anti-abortion. 
This study did not consider populism but is one of the first studies to look at religion’s influence 
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on democracy in the 21st century. Andrew Merton’s Enemies of Choice could address this 
oversight.  
Merton explores religious social conditioning by fundamentalist faith organizations 
through the creation of the Pro-life, or right-to-life movement and rhetoric. Merton argues that 
black and white arguments do not have exceptions, as evidenced in the language of pro-life 
rhetoric, which reinforces political initiatives like the Pro-life movement. Said differently, 
“most right-to-life literature presents this notion as fact” (Merton, 1981: 6). Merton 
hypothesizes that “all [Fundamentalist pro-life supporters] accept, without question, the right 
of each zygote to develop into an adult human being. Thus it follows that the vast majority of 
right-to-lifers wish to outlaw not only abortions, but certain birth control methods, notably the 
intrauterine device…” (Merton, 1981: 2). Merton suggests that the rhetoric of the right-to-life 
movement was successful due to “its emotional appeals and its disregard of logic (Merton, 
1981: 10).” Further, “the right-to-life movement resembles many other oppressive crusades in 
human history, from the earliest witch hunts to the Spanish Inquisition to the Nazis’ persecution 
of Jews and other Untermenschen (subhuman). All were based on false logic (ibid).” These 
religious ideologies construct cognitive distortions when situated within the American political 
landscape. With QAnon growing international appeal, it is imperative to identify the principles 
of fundamental social conditioning, the myth-making mechanism constructed when spirituality 
and religious communities have their faith co-opted for power dynamics, and to gain an 
understanding of how this principle expresses itself in policymaking today.  
Kettell & Djupe (2020) conducted a series of surveys to examine the impact of religious 
arguments on policy debates. The survey contained religious and secular cues designed to 
detect a bias before and after exposure to the treatments (Kettell & Djupe, 2020). The study 
found that secular arguments more frequently elicited a positive response, and religious 
arguments tended to distort political perceptions. They make a significant distinction here that 
the study showed that these perceptions were not a result of identity but were instead a result 
of exposure to charged rhetoric and bias stemming from political and religious institutions.  
 
Politicized Religion, Collective Action, and Identities 
Some scholars in the identity camp argue that religion is about belonging to a group more 
than it is a belief for populists (Marzouki et al., 2016). According to Marzouki et al. (2016), 
religious identities define who can be a part of the group and who cannot, which in turn helps 
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populists to leverage fundamentalist communities who feel threatened by cleavages such as 
Islamization for populist political gain. Cohen and Arato (2018) expand upon Marzouki (et al., 
2016) by examining religion as a tool to construct a salient cleavage between fundamental 
Christian populists and the other. They claim that populism “distinguishes religious 
associations… from the instrumental appropriation of it by populist demagogues” (Arato & 
Cohen, 2018: 14). When populism combines with the host of religions, it can create an 
existential threat for constitutional democracy and civil society, which is tantamount to a 
healthy democracy (Arato & Cohen, 2018). More recent work by Noury & Roland (2020) 
addresses the rapid expansion of the literature on populism and identity with a focus on Europe. 
Noury & Roland (2020) connected the rise of populism and nativism to social media and fake 
news. Their review ultimately found that the existing studies whose independent variables were 
economic factors tended to confirm that economic causes expedited populism, while surveys 
tended to show that cultural factors expedited the rise of populism. This review neglected to 
consider the social aspect of religion. 
The majority of this camp believes there is a positive association between religion and 
populism. In contrast, the new visibility of religion thesis (Hoelzl, 2020) argues that religion 
is potentially dangerous for populism, but the study of religion and populism needs to 
examine non-discursive elements of theology in populism. Hoelzl (2020) argues a negative 
relationship exists between populism and religion. He notes that populist leaders like Donald 
Trump tend to avoid referencing religious themes or making blatant theological references 
unless they are desperately pandering. Scholars within the other thread of identity in religious 
populism often overlook this point. 
 
False Idols: The Language of Evangelical Nationalism, Racism, and QAnon 
The non-discursive nature Hoelzl discusses is significantly understudied in the literature. 
Arguably discursive rhetoric is more influential because it can mobilize evangelical 
nationalism and perpetuate racism through rhetoric (Williams & Alexander, 1994). Examining 
the sign and the signified within the context of political rhetoric could help identify why 
charged rhetoric charms some individuals in a democracy. Williams and Alexander 
demonstrate that American populism drew upon religious imagery to gain legitimacy and 
influence. Deconstructing the mechanism of religious rhetoric is crucial to understand before 
diving into the False Idols literature. As mentioned above, Merton (1981) examines the ways 
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in which right-to-lifers employ “emotionally charged rhetoric” when framing the discussion of 
abortion. The signs of each word trigger an individual to derive meaning, the signified. 
Religious leaders semiotically create links that evoke emotionally charged accounts, 
weaponizing signs to manipulate intentions and narratives of the signified. Framing populism 
in a “prophetic civil religious frame offer[s] populism coherent diagnoses of current societal 
evils, prescribe[s] a better future for society” allows for populism to gain “cultural resources'' 
and a place within intergroup relations and public debate (Williams & Alexander, 1994: 13).  
Online spiritual and conspiracist communities provide a potential venue for respectability 
and resources to those susceptible to radicalization. In a world where technocrats control 
resources and status in society, it is tempting for stratified individuals to join these 
communities. There are incentives to exploit social media platforms with misinformation to 
weaken existing power structures (Ward & Voas, 2011). Many scholars started to study 
populist rhetoric after the 2016 US election. Trump’s populist rhetoric during and after the 
election normalized a nativist discourse which enabled him to leverage nationalist cleavages 
for his political gain Bonikowski (2019). This rhetoric signals through specific signs known as 
“dog whistles,” that Trump is complicit in action, whether he consciously admits it or not, of 
dangerous white supremacists groups who would twist their words and desired perception of 
reality to fit the preachings of Trump. For example, the QAnon conspiracy cult that arose in 
2017 took former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey’s tweet on the 
then trending internet hashtag “#fivejobs I’ve had” where users listed their previous jobs before 
entering their desired career and turned it into #FiveJihad. Switching the hashtag manipulated 
the sign to construct a narrative to evoke one of anti-Islamization (Zuckerman, 2019). Some in 
this vein of the literature believe the rise in support for groups like QAnon is because we have 
entered “a dark age for information literacy,” leading to a backsliding of accepted wisdom 
(Hannah, 2021). Others believe that network conspiratorial thinking (Zuckerman, 2019) 
exploits nationalist cleavages extant throughout liberal democracies in the Western world. 
These cleavages are driving the success of right-wing populist parties (Bonikowski, 
2019). QAnon’s doctrine is rooted in white supremacy. The conspiracy thrives off of racist and 
anti-Semitic tropes that have grave offline consequences. Racism is a uniting theme amongst 
religious populism. Evangelism draws upon symbols like a white Jesus, a white virgin Mary, 
and never explicitly condemns racism (Weed, 2017). Lamentably, white supremacy within 
religious populist movements is not a new phenomenon: "race, religion, and temperance often 
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troubled local manifestations of the movement" during the late 19th century and early 20th-
century populist movements in America (Williams & Alexander, 1994: 13) 
The false idols vein of the literature needs more robust empirical and intersectional 
studies. For instance, psychology and religious populism rarely exist within one study. The 
theoretical frameworks are nearly nonexistent, and empirical research is scarce. A branch of 
the theology literature researches the psychology of religion to seek and identify the salience 
of religious ideas and ingroup outgroup dynamics between religious individuals and secular 
individuals (LaBouff et al., 2012; Preston et al, 2013; Shariff et al., 2016). The study found that 
priming religion can increase intergroup bias in religious and secular individuals (LaBouff et 
al., 2012). While this research is not explicitly in the religious populism camp, it does offer 
transferable insights to help highlight intergroup bias and increasing the salience of racist and 
religious norms across cultures that could benefit the religious populism literature. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE LITERATURE  
The intersectional literature on religion and populism is siloed in many ways. There is a 
robust body of literature written in German that is not available in English.2 A minor constraint, 
but English translations could help settle the debate around the definition of populism and 
develop the religious populism literature. The English literature primarily focuses on populist 
political support garnered through institutions of the church while exploiting the institution of 
democracy.  However, the literature overlooks how these institutions seek to coerce and divide 
individuals to the will of both populist and liberal elites. The majority of the populist literature 
touches on the theme of identity. It does not provide enough empirical support to distinguish 
the causal factors mobilizing populism. More empirical work is necessary to examine the role 
identity plays in perpetuating the cognitive dissonance of supporting politicians who go against 
nearly every value of one’s faith and perpetuate the rise of populism.    
Taking the theoretical framework from much of the ethnic conflict literature could 
facilitate a more robust understanding of the politicization of religious identities to leverage 
support for populist values that contradict Christian values at times. There is potentially a 
similar mechanism normalizing cleavages between religious citizens and secular citizens that 
enables those who support religious populist movements to rationalize immoral behavior 
 




because a pastor told them to do so. Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks from the ethnic 
conflict literature could expand upon the work of Arato & Cohen (2018). 
There is a dire need for academic research surrounding conspiracy groups like QAnon. 
The QAnon conspiracy is rooted in racism with a cult-like following that has garnered a 
concerning amount of support. The populism literature discusses charismatic leaders in great 
detail but understanding the charismatic leaders of the church and how populists borrowed 
from the fundamental playbook would expand the literature. It would benefit everyone in a 
democracy to understand the mechanism fostering support for religious populist movements. 
Further examination of the intertwining of racism, religion, and populist identities is needed. 
These three factors are incredibly intertwined yet severely understudied. Studying the nature 
of race, religion, and populism could expand upon the work of Weed (2017) and HoSang & 
Lowndes (2019) thesis on the racialization of economic power in their work Producers, 
Parasites, Patriots. 
Adding to the identity literature and expanding upon gender would also improve the 
literature. There is a minuscule amount surrounding gender within the religious populism 
literature. Religion, and fundamentalism, in particular, have the power to construct world 
views, thinking patterns and create neural pathways in the brain. These patterns can 
disempower individuals susceptible to populist tendencies by indoctrinating individuals, which 
disempowers minorities who do not fit the evangelical populist constraints. Religious social 
conditioning can construct perceptions of reality. How do you awaken an individual to the truth 
that they have joined something more along the lines of a cult and not just a political 
movement? The literature should keep this question in mind, with a lens of community 
compassion not judgement, when informing future studies. Democracy scholars should 
especially analyze this construction in more detail, specifically studying the influences to the 
community, the behavior of citizens indoctrinated into black and white thinking patterns versus 
more flexible thinking patterns, or cognitive distortions, are unable to perceive reality.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The literature on religious populism needs scholarly research immediately. There is a 
heavy focus surrounding identity politics, discursive strategies employed by politicians to 
exploit religion, and evangelical nationalism within the religious populism literature. More 
diverse scholarly research, particularly surrounding race, gender, cognitive distortions 
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constructed by spiritually abusive fundamentalist communities, and interpersonal relations 
would improve the literature. Without a coherent understanding of religious populism, it is 
difficult to highlight how dangerous this phenomenon can be for the health of liberal 
democracy. Based on the literature above, society keeps having the recurring problem of 
populism because religion is an institution that informs behavior. A more robust literature could 
guide decision-makers to enact policies to prevent religious nationalism. Understanding 
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